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STEPPING UP TO THE PLATE: CAN THE CITY OF SAN JOSE
OVERCOME BASEBALL’S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION?
I. INTRODUCTION
As the 2014 Major League Baseball (“MLB” or the “League”)
season begins, the future of the Oakland Athletics (“A’s”) will not
only be determined on the field, but also in the courts.1  The A’s
franchise is in need of a makeover, either in the form of a new
ballpark in Oakland, or elsewhere.2  Enter the city of San Jose,
which is eager to increase its presence in the professional sports
marketplace.3  The city of San Jose is the largest U.S. city to lack an
NFL, NBA, or MLB franchise, despite the fact that the city, along
with the greater Silicon Valley region, has the resources to support
a successful professional baseball club.4  Not only does the city of
San Jose covet the A’s, but the A’s franchise has also clearly ex-
pressed a desire to relocate to San Jose.5  Preventing the marriage
between the A’s and the city of San Jose are the San Francisco Gi-
ants and MLB’s ironfisted control over the location of its
franchises.6  Therefore, the city of San Jose has sued MLB, alleging
1. See Brian Costa, Baseball’s Battle for Silicon Valley: As Oakland A’s Eye Move to
San Jose, Giants Get Territorial, WALL ST. J. (June 28, 2013, 1:27 PM), http://online
.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323873904578571490506017364.html (stating
fight for rights to San Jose baseball market “is becoming baseball’s version of the
Hundred Years War, an intractable slog between neighboring kingdoms vying for
land, power and wealth”).
2. See id. (noting A’s have played in Oakland Coliseum since 1968).  High-
lighting the need for a new stadium, “[o]n June 16, [2013,] a clogged pipe re-
sulted in pools of raw sewage in the locker rooms during a game at the Oakland
Coliseum.” Id.
3. See Henry Grabar, Can San Jose Really Sue Its Way to a Major League Baseball
Team?, ATLANTIC CITIES (June 25, 2013), http://www.theatlanticcities.com/jobs-
and-economy/2013/06/can-san-jose-really-sue-its-way-major-league-baseball-team/
5982/ (discussing viability of San Jose as professional sports market).
4. See id. (“San Jose wants the A’s, and has reserved a discounted plot of pub-
lic land for the team”); see also Costa, supra note 1 (noting “treasure trove of corpo- R
rate sponsors and disposable income” available to professional baseball team
operating closest to Silicon Valley).
5. See Costa, supra note 1 (noting Cisco Systems, Inc. has agreed to back A’s in R
constructing new ballpark in San Jose); see also Grabar, supra note 3 (noting A’s R
have raised $500 million to build new ballpark in San Jose).
6. See Grabar, supra note 3 (revealing that San Francisco Giants and MLB as- R
serted that San Jose baseball market belongs to San Francisco Giants).
(431)
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that the League’s efforts to disrupt the relocation of the A’s from
Oakland to San Jose violate federal antitrust laws.7
Professional baseball enjoys a unique status as “the only profes-
sional sport to enjoy a judicially created exemption from federal
antitrust law.”8  As such, MLB is permitted to maintain monopolies
in professional baseball markets by assigning specific territorial
rights to its franchises.9  MLB’s unique status is the product of pro-
fessional baseball’s complex beginnings and the unwillingness of
the courts and the legislature to disturb its development.10
The history of professional baseball in the United States dates
back to 1871 when the National Association of Professional Baseball
Players became the first professional baseball league.11  Over the
next several decades, a litany of competing professional baseball
leagues emerged, such as the National League, the Players’ League,
the American League, and the Federal League.12  Subsequently, the
rules controlling the sport, franchise location, league size, and allo-
cation of players continued to evolve.13
As professional baseball matured, the courts recognized that
the sport enjoyed a “unique place in our American heritage,” which
in relation to other professional sports, placed it “on higher
ground.”14  Congress and the courts have been reluctant to disturb
7. See id. (noting San Jose filed lawsuit against MLB for “stalling the Oakland
A’s move to relocate to a plot of land just west of San Jose’s Diridon Station.”).
8. See Nathaniel Grow, Defining the “Business of Baseball”: A Proposed Framework
for Determining the Scope of Professional Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 44 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 557, 559 (2010) (noting United States Supreme Court’s creation and affirma-
tion of professional baseball’s antitrust exemption from antitrust law); see also Fed.
Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200,
208 (1922) (holding professional baseball is not subject to federal antitrust law).
9. See Grabar, supra note 3 (noting MLB’s ability to control franchise geogra- R
phy and monopolize baseball markets affords league unique position in realm of
major professional American sports).
10. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s holding in Flood v. Kuhn, 407
U.S. 258 (1972) and its recognition of the peculiar development of professional
baseball in light of inconsistencies in case law, see infra notes 75-83 and accompa- R
nying text.
11. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 261 (discussing beginnings of professional baseball
and upholding baseball’s antitrust exemption).
12. See id. at 261-62 (noting professional baseball’s lack of centralized
development).
13. See id. (noting development of “the home run ball; the shifting of
franchises; the expansion of leagues; the installation in 1965 of the major league
draft”).
14. Id. at 266-67 (discussing procedural history of Flood v. Kuhn and baseball’s
importance to American public, observing “‘it would be unfortunate indeed if a
fine sport and profession . . . were to suffer in the least because of undue concen-
tration by any one or any group on commercial and profit considerations’”) (quot-
ing Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)).
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the sport’s development, and therefore professional baseball
evolved largely free from the purview of antitrust law.15  Neverthe-
less, courts continue to receive complaints regarding baseball’s anti-
trust exemption and the allocation of territorial rights.16  In fact,
the city of San Francisco threatened to sue MLB in 2009 when the
league contemplated moving the A’s to San Jose.17
On June 18, 2013, the city of San Jose filed suit against MLB
alleging the League’s refusal to allow the A’s to relocate to San Jose
violates federal and state antitrust laws.18  Specifically, San Jose
claims that MLB’s constitutional provision restricting franchises
from operating within another franchise’s territory, without the
written consent of that member, unreasonably restrains trade, con-
stitutes conspiracy and violates antitrust law.19  The city of San Jose
not only seeks damages, but also requests that the court enjoin
MLB from enforcing its constitution to the extent that it prevents
the A’s from relocating to San Jose.20  Recently, U.S. District Judge
Ronald M. Whyte dismissed San Jose’s antitrust claims, ruling that
they were barred by MLB’s antitrust exemption.21  However, San
15. See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text (discussing Court’s recogni- R
tion of complexities associated with development of professional baseball).  The
Supreme Court concluded congressional inaction regarding baseball’s status
under antitrust law to demonstrate Congress’ unwillingness to address issues asso-
ciated with baseball’s exemption. Flood, 407 U.S. at 283-84.
16. See Grow, supra note 8, at 563 (“MLB’s restrictive territory allocation poli- R
cies” have become “a regular source of antitrust complaints against the league.”).
17. See id. (noting San Jose is within territory allocated to San Francisco Gi-
ants) (citing John Cote, S.F. Threatens Suit if A’s Move to San Jose, S.F. CHRON. (Dec.
18, 2009, 4:00 AM), available at http://www.sfgate.com/athletics/article/S-F-threat
ens-suit-if-A-s-move-to-San-Jose-3205965.php (“The Giants have long-established
territorial rights to San Jose, and say moving a team there would undercut their fan
base and revenue.”)); see also Costa, supra note 1 (“More than four years have R
passed since baseball commissioner Bud Selig appointed a committee to study the
Athletics’ proposed move from Oakland to San Jose.  Yet because the Giants refuse
to relinquish their exclusive rights to the area, the issue remains unresolved.”).
18. See generally Complaint, City of San Jose v. Office of Comm’r of Baseball,
No. 5:13CV02787, 2013 WL 2996788 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2013) (setting forth San
Jose’s claims against MLB); see also MLB’s Refusal to Allow Oakland A’s Move is Anti-
trust Violation, Suit Says, 25 No. 6 WESTLAW J. ENT. INDUS. 1 (2013) (discussing com-
plaint filed by city of San Jose).
19. See MLB’s Refusal to Allow Oakland A’s Move is Antitrust Violation, Suit Says,
supra note 18, at 1-2 (“MLB is relying on a provision of its constitution that says ‘no R
franchise shall be granted for an operating territory within the operating territory
of a member without the written consent of such member.’”).
20. See id. at 2 (discussing relief requested by city of San Jose).
21. See City of San Jose v. Office of Comm’r of Baseball, No. C-13-02787 RMW,
2013 WL 5609346, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2013) (holding “MLB’s alleged inter-
ference with the A’s relocation to San Jose is exempt from antitrust regulation”);
see also infra notes 159-162 (discussing district court’s holding in City of San Jose).
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Jose plans to appeal the decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals.22
Part II of this article provides a brief background on the devel-
opment of federal antitrust law in the United States and its applica-
tion in the context of professional sports.23 Part III discusses the
Supreme Court cases that established and upheld professional base-
ball’s antitrust exemption.24  This section also addresses lower
courts’ interpretations of the scope of the exemption and how it
relates to the issue of franchise relocation.25  Part IV discusses the
background and potential outcomes of San Jose’s lawsuit against
MLB, as well as the improbability that this case presents the proper
opportunity for the court to eliminate baseball’s exemption from
antitrust law.26  This article concludes that if San Jose is determined
to acquire the A’s, then its best course of action is to reach a settle-
ment with MLB providing for the relocation of the franchise.27
II. BACKGROUND: ANTITRUST AND PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
Prior to discussing the creation of professional baseball’s anti-
trust exemption, it is worth briefly discussing federal antitrust law
and its application in the realm of professional sports.28  In the late
nineteenth century, Congress enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act
(“the Act”), which was designed to combat anticompetitive prac-
22. See S. Jose’s Claims Against MLB Denied, ESPN.COM (Oct. 11, 2013, 7:11 PM),
http://espn.go.com/mlb/story/_/id/9809824/judge-rejects-san-jose-antitrust-
claims-vs-mlb (noting San Jose’s lawyer finding “‘it hard to believe Major League
Baseball is not subject to the same antitrust rules that apply to all other sports’”).
23. For a discussion of the Sherman Antitrust Act and elements of an antitrust
claim, see infra notes 28-39 and accompanying text. R
24. For a discussion of the trilogy of Supreme Court cases pertaining to pro-
fessional baseball’s status under antitrust laws, see infra notes 41-83 and accompa- R
nying text.
25. For a discussion of the split in lower courts regarding the scope of base-
ball’s antitrust exemption see infra notes 84-111 and accompanying text. R
26. See Jared Feldman, Analyzing Potential Outcomes of San Jose’s Suit Against
MLB, YAHOO! NEWS (Jun. 28, 2013, 1:12 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/analyzing-
potential-outcomes-san-jose-suit-against-mlb-171200518.html (discussing potential
outcomes of San Jose’s suit against MLB, asserting settlement is most likely result).
For a discussion of the potential outcomes and impacts of a trial compared to
those of a potential settlement agreement, see infra notes 143-208 and accompany- R
ing text.
27. For a discussion of the benefits of a potential settlement agreement, see
infra notes 201-208 and accompanying text. R
28. See Jeffrey Gordon, Note, Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption and Franchise Reloca-
tion: Can a Team Move?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1201, 1203-06 (1999) (discussing
Sherman Antitrust Act).
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tices, such as monopolization and other restraints on free trade.29
The Sherman Antitrust Act sought to promote competition based
on “the notion that the unrestrained interaction of competitive
forces would lead to the ‘best allocation of economic resources, the
lowest price, the highest quality and the greatest material
progress.’”30
Professional sports-related claims alleging violations of the
Sherman Antitrust Act are generally brought under Section One of
the Act.31  This section states that “[e]very contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is de-
clared to be illegal.”32  In order to state a claim under Section One
of the Act, a plaintiff must show “(1) a contract, combination or
conspiracy between two or more individuals or entities, (2) causing
an unreasonable restraint of trade and (3) having an impact on
interstate commerce.”33
With respect to the first element, a party suing a professional
sports league will usually argue that the league is composed of inde-
pendent franchises, and thus any unreasonable restraint on compe-
tition between those franchises amounts to a violation of antitrust
law.34  As for the second element, a plaintiff may argue that the
league’s conduct is so obviously anticompetitive that it is per se ille-
gal.35  In the alternative, a plaintiff can argue that a league’s re-
straint on trade is unreasonable by showing that any pro-
competitive effects associated with such a restraint are outweighed
29. See id. at 1203-04 (noting Sherman Antitrust Act responded to threats to
competition posed by big business).
30. Id. at 1204 (discussing Congressional intent in enacting Sherman Anti-
trust Act).
31. See id. (discussing elements of antitrust claim under Section One of Sher-
man Antitrust Act).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). See generally Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209
(1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2012)) (discussing penalty for
illegal restraint of trade).
33. Gordon, supra note 28, at 1204 (discussing elements of professional sports R
related antitrust claims).
34. See id. (discussing first element of claim, stating “[i]f a sports league is
considered a ‘single entity’ pursuing a single purpose, then by definition it cannot
violate Section 1.  However, if the league consists of independent entities, each
pursuing a diverse and competing purpose, then any unreasonable restraint be-
tween league members constitutes an antitrust violation.”).
35. See id. at 1205 (discussing per se illegal test, noting test applies to anticom-
petitive conduct “lack[ing] any redeeming virtue”).
5
Becker: Stepping Up to the Plate: Can the City of San Jose Overcome Baseb
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
35091-vls_21-2 Sheet No. 97 Side B      09/19/2014   14:26:10
35091-vls_21-2 Sheet No. 97 Side B      09/19/2014   14:26:10
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\21-2\VLS206.txt unknown Seq: 6 12-SEP-14 12:46
436 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21: p. 431
by the restraint’s anticompetitive effects.36  Finally, regarding the
third element, it would appear obvious that a professional sports
league, such as MLB, is engaged in interstate commerce, given that
such leagues are composed of member clubs that travel from state
to state to compete in events that are commonly broadcasted across
the country.37  Thus, any unreasonable restraint on trade would
likely have an impact on interstate commerce.38  However, as the
next section discusses, the Supreme Court initially established pro-
fessional baseball’s exemption from federal antitrust law by finding
that the business of professional baseball does not constitute inter-
state commerce.39
III. BASEBALL’S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
“Baseball, unlike the other major professional American sports,
enjoys wide-ranging exemption from antitrust laws.”40
A. Origins: The Supreme Court Lineup
1. Leading Off: Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National
League of Professional Baseball Clubs
In 1922, the United States Supreme Court handed down its
first decision regarding the status of professional baseball under
federal antitrust law.41  In the early 1900s, professional baseball was
composed of two principal leagues: the American League and the
National League.42  However, the American and National Leagues
were not without competitors, such as the Federal League, which
sought to assert itself as a rival in the landscape of professional base-
ball.43  To challenge the American and National Leagues’
36. See id. (discussing rule of reason test, stating court determines whether
restraint “ ‘merely regulates or perhaps thereby promotes competition, or whether
it . . . may suppress or even destroy competition’”).
37. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s eventual recognition that profes-
sional baseball is engaged in interstate commerce, see infra notes 76-77 and accom- R
panying text.
38. See Gordon, supra note 28, at 1204 (setting forth third element of antitrust R
claim).
39. For a discussion of Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of
Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), see infra notes 41-54 and accompanying R
text (finding professional baseball exempt from federal antitrust laws).
40. See Grabar, supra note 3 (explaining creation of baseball’s antitrust R
exemption).
41. See Grow, supra note 8, at 565-66 (discussing role of Federal Baseball in es- R
tablishment of baseball’s antitrust exemption).
42. See id. at 566 (describing American League and National League as “the
predominant leagues in professional baseball during the 1910s.”).
43. See id. (discussing Federal League’s background).
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supremacy, the Federal League brought an antitrust suit against the
American and National Leagues.44  In response to the Federal
League’s attempts to weaken the American and National Leagues’
control over professional baseball, the American and National
Leagues purchased seven of the eight Federal League teams, or
“clubs”.45  As the lone member of the Federal League to reject the
buyout, the owner of the Baltimore Terrapins decided to file a new
suit against the American and National Leagues.46  In Federal Base-
ball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, the Baltimore Terrapins sued the American League and the
National League, in addition to persons of power associated with
these leagues, for their roles in conspiring to dismantle the Federal
League.47  The Baltimore club “alleged that these defendants con-
spired to monopolize the [baseball] business.”48
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Holmes held that pro-
fessional baseball was not subject to federal antitrust law.49  In his
opinion, Justice Holmes summarized the “nature of the business” of
baseball, concluding that “[t]he business is giving exhibitions of
base ball, which are purely state affairs.”50  The Supreme Court re-
jected the notion that professional baseball’s scheme, which in-
volves teams travelling across state lines to compete, constitutes
44. See id. (“After the AL and NL rejected the Federal League’s merger inquir-
ies, the Federal League owners filed an antitrust suit against the two established
leagues alleging violations of both Sections One and Two of the Sherman Act.”).
45. See id. (noting threat of suit and cost of competing with Federal League
drove American and National Leagues to purchase Federal League clubs).
46. See Roger I. Abrams, Before the Flood: The History of Baseball’s Antitrust Exemp-
tion, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 307, 308 (1999) (noting “benefits of the settlement were
not evenly distributed among participants in the Federal League,” and describing
Baltimore Terrapins owner as feeling insulted by offer).
47. See Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 207 (1922) (setting forth parties in suit); see also Gordon, supra
note 28, at 1207 (“The Baltimore club, a member of the Federal League of Profes- R
sional Baseball Clubs (‘Federal League’), sued both major leagues (the American
League and the National league).”).
48. Fed. Baseball, 259 U.S. at 207 (stating plaintiff’s allegations that defendants
conspired to destroy Federal League “by buying up some of the constituent clubs
and in one way or another inducing all those clubs except the plaintiff to leave
their League”); see also Abrams, supra note 46, at 308 (“There was little doubt the R
owners had engaged in a combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade which
injured the stockholders of the Baltimore franchise.”).
49. See Fed. Baseball, 259 U.S. at 208 (affirming decision by appellate court
“that the defendants were not within the Sherman Act”).
50. Id. (holding professional baseball is not subject to federal antitrust law
because baseball business does not amount to interstate commerce); see also Grow,
supra note 8, at 567 (noting Federal Baseball court considered business of baseball R
was not intrastate commerce because “manner in which baseball teams generated
revenue” at time was “the sale of tickets to baseball games held in a single state”).
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interstate commerce.51  The Court emphasized “the fact that in or-
der to give the exhibitions the Leagues must induce free persons to
cross state lines and must arrange and pay for their doing so is not
enough to change the character of the business.”52
The Supreme Court’s limited conception of the business of
baseball as “providing exhibitions to the public” has become out-
dated since its 1922 decision.53  Nevertheless, Justice Holmes’s
opinion in Federal Baseball, establishing that professional baseball
does not fall under the purview of federal antitrust law, is the foun-
dation of baseball’s unique status among American professional
sports.54
2. Hit and Run: Toolson v. New York Yankees
In 1953, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of professional
baseball’s status under antitrust laws.55  In Toolson v. New York
Yankees, the Court addressed three companion cases alleging that
the owners of professional baseball clubs violated antitrust laws.56
In those cases, the various plaintiffs alleged that baseball’s enforce-
ment of standard reserve clauses in players’ contracts impermissibly
restrained trade in violation of antitrust laws.57  The standard re-
serve clause was a “provision included at the time in all baseball
player contracts that precluded players from negotiating future
contracts with anyone but their current employer.”58  In the Toolson
case, a seasoned minor league player within the New York Yankees’
51. See Fed. Baseball, 259 U.S. at 208 (“It is true that in order to attain for these
exhibitions the great popularity that they have achieved, competitions must be ar-
ranged between clubs from different cities and States.”).
52. See id. at 208-09 (“That which in its consummation is not commerce does
not become commerce among the State because the transportation that we have
mentioned takes place.”).
53. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972) (acknowledging, “Professional
baseball is a business and it is engaged in interstate commerce”); see also Grow,
supra note 8, at 568 (noting Federal Baseball opinion is widely criticized, but conclu- R
sion that baseball games are “purely state affairs” reflected “realities of the profes-
sional baseball business in 1922”).
54. See Grabar, supra note 3 (noting origin of baseball’s antitrust exemption R
and Justice Holmes’s finding teams’ interstate travel “merely incidental”).
55. See Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (per curiam) (not-
ing business of baseball had “been left for thirty years to develop, on the under-
standing that it was not subject to existing antitrust legislation”).
56. See id. at 356 (addressing Kowalski v. Chandler, 202 F.2d 413 (6th Cir.
1953) and Corbett v. Chandler, F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1952)).
57. See id. at 362-63 (Burton, J., dissenting) (asserting baseball is interstate
commerce that should be subject to antitrust laws because Congress has neither
expressly exempted professional baseball from these laws, nor has any court found
implied exemption exists).
58. Grow, supra note 8, at 561 (explaining reserve clause). R
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organization sued the club after being “blacklisted” because he re-
fused to report to the minor league team to which he had been
assigned.59  Overall, the plaintiffs in Toolson and one of the com-
panion cases asserted that “organized baseball, through its illegal
monopoly and unreasonable restraints of trade, exploits the players
who attract the profits for the benefit of the clubs and leagues.”60
Specifically, in the case of Toolson, enforcement of the reserve
clause precluded a minor league player from pursuing an opportu-
nity to play in the major leagues elsewhere.61  In addition to allega-
tions regarding the reserve clause, the plaintiffs also contended that
the owners of professional baseball clubs “entered into a combina-
tion, conspiracy and monopoly or an attempt to monopolize profes-
sional baseball in the United States.”62
In the thirty-one years since the Supreme Court handed down
its decision in Federal Baseball, the business of baseball had become
more complex than “providing exhibitions to the public.”63  How-
ever, despite the advent of technologies and methods of broadcast-
ing games, which transformed professional baseball into a form of
interstate commerce, the Toolson court disposed of the three cases
on the basis of the Court’s decision in Federal Baseball.64  In the be-
ginning of its brief per curiam decision, the Court rehashed its hold-
ing in Federal Baseball, stating “the business of providing public
baseball games for profit between clubs of professional baseball
players was not within the scope of federal antitrust laws.”65  Rather
than addressing the realities of the business of baseball in the
1950s, the Court upheld the exemption and delegated the job of
59. Id. at 569 (summarizing facts of Toolson).
60. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 362-64 (Burton, J., dissenting) (stating also, “because
of illegal and inequitable agreements of interstate scope between organized base-
ball and the Mexican League binding each to respect the other’s ‘reserve clauses’
they have lost the services of and contract rights to certain baseball players”).
61. See Grow, supra note 8, at 569 (noting plaintiff’s desire to play in Major R
Leagues and frustration with relegation to minor leagues for several years).
62. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 364 (Burton, J., dissenting) (summarizing allegations
from Toolson and companion cases).
63. Grow, supra note 8, at 569 (noting significant changes in business of base- R
ball since Supreme Court’s Federal Baseball decision, “[m]ost notably, the broad-
casting of baseball games across state lines via both radio and television”).  For a
discussion of the Federal Baseball decision, see supra notes 49-54 and accompanying R
text.
64. See Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357 (affirming lower courts’ holdings on authority
of Federal Baseball “so far as that decision determines that Congress had no inten-
tion of including the business of baseball within the scope of federal antitrust
laws”).
65. Id. (affirming earlier opinions by seven-to-two vote, relying on holding in
Federal Baseball).
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altering the status of professional baseball under antitrust laws to
Congress.66  Instead of discussing whether the business of baseball
constituted interstate commerce, the Supreme Court reinterpreted
its decision in Federal Baseball “to stand for the proposition that Con-
gress had never intended for baseball to fall within the purview of
the Sherman Act in the first place.”67  Thus, the Toolson court re-
characterized the justification for professional baseball’s antitrust
exemption from one based on the business of baseball to one based
on congressional intent in the passage of federal antitrust laws.68
3. Bases Loaded: Flood v. Kuhn
In 1972, fifty years after its decision in Federal Baseball, the Su-
preme Court was once again presented with the task of ruling on
baseball’s antitrust status.69  In Flood v. Kuhn, the petitioner, Curt
Flood, brought an antitrust suit against the Commissioner of Base-
ball, Bowie Kuhn, stemming from Flood’s frustration with being
traded from the St. Louis Cardinals to the Philadelphia Phillies in
1969.70  Flood, who had not been consulted about the trade, re-
quested to be made a free agent by the commissioner so that he
could sign with the team of his choosing.71  After Commissioner
Kuhn denied Flood’s request on the basis of the reserve clause in
the player’s contract, Flood brought suit in federal court against
Commissioner Kuhn, the two major leagues’ presidents and all
twenty-four MLB organizations.72  The complaint alleged violations
of antitrust law and the Thirteenth Amendment.73  The district
66. See id. (“We think that if there are evils in this field which now warrant
application to it of the antitrust laws it should be by legislation.”).
67. Grow, supra note 8, at 570 (noting Toolson court did not uphold antitrust R
exemption on basis of Justice Holmes’s reasoning in Federal Baseball).
68. See id. at 570-71 (discussing deceptive nature of Toolson decision consider-
ing congressional intent was not discussed in Federal Baseball).
69. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 259 (1972) (“For the third time in 50
years the Court is asked specifically to rule that professional baseball’s reserve sys-
tem is within the reach of the federal antitrust laws.”).
70. See id. at 265 (discussing facts of Flood).
71. See id. at 265-66 (noting Flood sat out 1970 season after refusing to play
for Philadelphia Phillies).
72. See id. at 265 (noting Flood initially brought suit in Southern District of
New York); see also Grow, supra note 8, at 574 (explaining that Flood was denied R
free agency because of reserve clause in his contract).
73. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 265-66 (“[C]omplaint charged violations of the fed-
eral antitrust laws and civil rights statutes, violation of state statutes and the com-
mon law, and the imposition of a form of peonage and involuntary servitude
contrary to the Thirteenth Amendment . . . .”).
10
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court found in favor of the defendants, and the Second Circuit
affirmed.74
In affirming the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court adhered
to its precedent in Federal Baseball and Toolson.75  However, unlike
the Toolson court, Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, sought
to explicitly acknowledge and address certain issues and peculiari-
ties associated with baseball’s antitrust exemption.76  Justice Black-
mun began by proclaiming that “[p]rofessional baseball is a
business and it is engaged in interstate commerce.”77  Next, the
Court noted baseball’s status under federal antitrust laws is “an ex-
ception and an anomaly,” and that the Court’s Federal Baseball and
Toolson decisions “have become an aberration confined to base-
ball.”78  The Court went on to note that “the aberration is an estab-
lished one,” which had been recognized for fifty years and in five
consecutive cases in the Supreme Court, and thus should be “fully
entitled to the benefit of stare decisis.”79
The opinion emphasized that since the Supreme Court’s 1922
ruling in Federal Baseball, professional baseball “has been allowed to
develop and to expand unhindered by federal legislative action.”80
Furthermore, the Court worried that if it overturned Federal Baseball
it would result in substantial confusion and retroactivity issues.81
Additionally, the Flood court disposed of the plaintiff’s antitrust
74. See Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264, 267-68 (2d. Cir. 1971) (affirming judg-
ment of dismissal by five-to-three vote); see also Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271,
284-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (holding Federal Baseball and Toolson decisions were
controlling).
75. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 284-85 (“We continue to be loath . . . to overturn
those cases judicially when Congress, by its positive inaction, has allowed those
decisions to stand for so long and, far beyond mere inference and implication, has
clearly evinced a desire not to disapprove them legislatively.”).
76. See id. at 282-83 (listing observations).
77. Id. at 282-84 (upholding Federal Baseball despite finding that professional
baseball is engaged in interstate commerce); see also Grow, supra note 8, at 574 R
(suggesting Justice Blackmun’s proclamation effectively “repudiat[ed] the primary
holding in Federal Baseball”).
78. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282 (discussing professional baseball’s reserve system).
79. Id. (listing Supreme Court cases recognizing baseball’s antitrust exemp-
tion, and noting exemption “rests on a recognition and an acceptance of baseball’s
unique characteristics and needs”).
80. Id. at 283 (concluding failure to enact remedial legislation over fifty year
period “deemed to be something other than mere congressional silence and pas-
sivity,” and evinces no intention on the part of Congress to bring reserve system
under antitrust laws).
81. See id. (stating Court’s preference that any change to baseball’s antitrust
status “come by legislative action that, by its nature, is only prospective in opera-
tion”); see also Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (per curiam)
(discussing Court’s concern with “retrospective effect” associated with overturning
Federal Baseball).
11
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claims founded in state law, agreeing with the reasoning of the
lower courts regarding the inapplicability of state antitrust laws.82
Justice Blackmun concluded the opinion by proclaiming the
Court’s staunch unwillingness to alter its stance on the status of pro-
fessional baseball under federal antitrust laws, stating that, “what
the Court said in Federal Baseball in 1922 and what it said in Tool-
son in 1953, we say again here in 1972: the remedy, if any is indi-
cated, is for congressional, and not judicial, action.”83
B. Pitching Out of a Jam: Difficulties with Franchise Relocation
1. Interpretations of Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption
In general, the “business of baseball” is exempt from antitrust
law.84  However, lower courts disagree as to the range of activities
that constitute the “business of baseball,” and therefore the scope
of baseball’s antitrust exemption is not entirely clear.85  In most
cases, lower courts have held that baseball’s exemption permits
more than the mere enforcement of reserve clauses.86  For in-
stance, in Finley v. Kuhn, the Seventh Circuit analyzed the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Federal Baseball, Toolson and Flood, concluding
that “the Supreme Court intended to exempt the business of base-
ball, not any particular facet of that business, from the federal anti-
trust laws.”87
82. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 284-85 (agreeing with lower courts’ rationales regard-
ing state law antitrust claims in light of Supreme Court jurisprudence); see also
Flood, 443 F.2d at 268 (“[A]s the burden on interstate commerce outweighs the
states’ interests in regulating baseball’s reserve system, the Commerce Clause pre-
cludes the application here of state antitrust law.”); see also Flood, 316 F. Supp. at
280 (emphasizing “nationwide character” of professional baseball and “necessary
interdependence” of member teams require “uniformity” in regulation of
baseball).
83. Flood, 407 U.S. at 285 (noting Supreme Court’s strong reluctance to over-
turn Federal Baseball and Toolson).
84. See Grow, supra note 8, at 577 (noting Federal Baseball, Toolson and Flood R
still represent primary authorities for examining scope of baseball’s antitrust
exemption).
85. See Gordon, supra note 28, at 1210 (noting Supreme Court has not con- R
fronted challenge to baseball’s antitrust exemption since Flood, resulting in split in
federal courts regarding extent of exemption); see also Grow, supra note 8, at 580 R
(urging courts to hold “business of baseball” covers “business activities directly re-
lated to providing baseball entertainment to the public”).
86. See generally Salerno v. Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003
(2d. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 925 (1988) (dismissing antitrust suit filed by
discharged umpires); see also Prof’l Baseball Sch. and Clubs, Inc. v. Kuhn, 693 F.2d
1085 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (finding “franchise location system” to be “in-
tegral part of the business of baseball”). See Gordon, supra note 28, at 1210-11 R
(discussing cases interpreting business of baseball broadly).
87. Finley v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 541 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876
(1978) (downplaying references in Flood to reserve system in arriving at broad con-
12
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In Major League Baseball v. Crist, the Eleventh Circuit consid-
ered whether the contraction of the number of teams in profes-
sional baseball leagues constituted a protected activity within the
bounds of baseball’s antitrust exemption.88  Although the Crist
court acknowledged that baseball’s exemption is limited under cer-
tain circumstances, it ultimately interpreted the scope of the ex-
emption broadly.89  The Crist court concluded that the number of
teams that may participate in league play was “central to baseball’s
league structure.”90  Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that contrac-
tion of professional baseball teams constitutes an activity protected
by professional baseball’s antitrust exemption.91
On the other hand, a few courts have adopted a narrow view of
baseball’s antitrust exemption, contending that it only applies to
the enforcement of reserve clauses.92  In the 1993 case of Piazza v.
Major League Baseball, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania became
the first court to limit the scope of the exemption in this way.93  In
Piazza, an investment group sued MLB, alleging violations of fed-
eral antitrust laws after the league rejected the group’s proposal to
purchase the San Francisco Giants franchise and move the club to
Tampa Bay.94
In its analysis, the Piazza court asserted that “[i]n each of the
three cases in which the Supreme Court directly addressed the ex-
emption, the factual context involved the reserve clause.”95  The Pi-
azza court limited each of the three Supreme Court cases to their
facts, contending that the Flood decision “stripped from Federal
ception of exemption’s scope); see also Gordon, supra note 28, at 1211 (noting R
Finley case was first post-Flood challenge to baseball’s antitrust exemption).
88. See Major League Baseball v. Crist, 331 F.3d 1177, 1183 (11th Cir. 2003)
(holding business of baseball clearly includes decision to contract).
89. See Crist, 331 F.3d at 1183 (“[A]ntitrust exemption has not been held to
immunize the dealings between professional baseball clubs and third parties.”).
90. Id. (noting decisions regarding number of teams and their organization
into leagues are “basic elements of the production of major league baseball
games,” which affects revenue sharing).
91. See id. at 1184 (“[N]o inquiry into MLB’s motives or desires could possibly
change the fact that contraction implicates the heart of the ‘business of
baseball.’”).
92. See Grow, supra note 8, at 585-86 (discussing decisions restricting base- R
ball’s exemption to player reserve system).
93. See Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 421 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(holding defendants could not claim exemption from antitrust liability because
exemption only applied to baseball’s “reserve system”).
94. See Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 422-24 (explaining that plaintiffs sued after Gi-
ants franchise was not only sold to different investor group, which elected to keep
team in San Francisco, but also paid lower price than plaintiffs offered).
95. Id. at 435 (discussing allegations in Federal Baseball, Toolson and Flood).
13
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Baseball and Toolson any precedential value those cases may have
had beyond the particular facts there involved, i.e., the reserve
clause.”96  Moreover, the Piazza court emphasized the repeated ref-
erences to baseball’s reserve system in the Flood opinion to support
the assertion that the Flood Court had intended to limit the exemp-
tion to the reserve clause.97
In 1994, the Supreme Court of Florida adopted the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania’s reasoning in Piazza when it decided But-
terworth v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs.  In But-
terworth, the Supreme Court of Florida limited the applicability of
baseball’s antitrust exemption to the reserve clause.98  A year later,
the Second District Court of Appeal of Florida followed suit in Mor-
sani v. Major League Baseball.99  Ultimately, the strength of the argu-
ment that the antitrust exemption is limited to the reserve system
has weakened since the Butterworth and Morsani cases were decided,
and, as the Crist opinion reveals, even the Florida Attorney General
has retreated from the assertion that baseball’s antitrust exemption
is so narrowly limited.100
96. Id. (noting creation of exemption in Federal Baseball undermined by Flood
court’s recognition of baseball’s engagement in interstate commerce).  For a more
detailed discussion of the Supreme Court’s holding in Flood, see supra notes 75-83 R
and accompanying text.
97. See Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 436 (demonstrating Supreme Court’s intention
to limit baseball’s antitrust exemption to reserve clause); see also Gordon, supra
note 28, at 1213 (“Piazza therefore held that baseball’s exemption applies only to R
the reserve clause, not to the business of baseball and, more specifically, not to
franchise relocation.”); Grow, supra note 8, at 587 (noting reserve system refer- R
enced four times in Piazza opinion).
98. See Butterworth v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d 1021,
1024-25 (Fla. 1994) (noting analysis of Supreme Court baseball cases in Piazza and
arriving at same conclusion regarding Flood and restriction of antitrust exemption
to baseball’s reserve system); see also Grow, supra note 8, at 588 (stating issue facing R
Florida Supreme Court was “whether the baseball exemption prevented Florida’s
Attorney General from issuing civil investigative demands to MLB as part of an
antitrust investigation arising out of the same failed attempt to bring the San Fran-
cisco Giants to Tampa By that was at issue in Piazza”).
99. See Morsani v. Major League Baseball, 663 So. 2d 653, 655-57 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1995) (discussing allegations of MLB antitrust violations after several failed
attempts to bring franchise to Tampa Bay).  The Morsani holding relied on the
Supreme Court of Florida’s recent decision in Butterworth and without thoroughly
discussing the reasoning in Piazza or the Supreme Court baseball cases. See Mor-
sani, 663 So. 2d at 657 (discussing briefly holding in Piazza); see also Grow, supra
note 8, at 588 (noting Florida Supreme Court’s Butterworth decision was binding R
authority).
100. See Major League Baseball v. Crist, 331 F.3d 1177, 1183 (11th Cir. 2003)
(“The ‘business of baseball’ is exempt from the federal antitrust laws . . . and the
Attorney General no longer contends that the federal exemption extends only to
the player reserve system.”).
14
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2. The Realities of Franchise Relocation
Franchise relocation rarely occurs in MLB.101  As previously
discussed, decisions concerning the structure of professional base-
ball are protected by baseball’s antitrust exemption because those
decisions are central to the “business of baseball.”102  In order for
an American League franchise, such as the A’s, to relocate, not only
must three-quarters of the clubs within its league sign off on the
move, but a majority of clubs in the National League must also ap-
prove the relocation.103  Moreover, franchises seeking to relocate
must comply with baseball’s “boundary rules.”104  MLB’s boundary
rules prohibit a major league club from playing its home games
within another club’s territory or within fifteen miles of another
club’s territory.105  However, a club may operate within another
club’s home territory if the latter club grants protected territory or
provides written consent to the other club allowing it to operate
within its boundaries.106
Professional baseball’s boundary rules represent a clear viola-
tion of antitrust laws because they hinder competition through re-
striction of franchise movement, and they allow clubs to maintain
monopolies in specified regions.107  Thus, lawsuits arising from ac-
101. See Gordon, supra note 28, at 1213-14 (noting MLB “prohibits franchise R
movements ‘except in the most dire circumstances where the local community has,
over a sustained period, demonstrated that it cannot or will not support a
franchise’”).
102. Minn. Twins P’ship v. State, 592 N.W.2d 847, 856 (Minn. 1999) (“[T]he
sale and relocation of a baseball franchise, like the reserve clause discussed in
Flood, is an integral part of the business of professional baseball and falls within
the exception.”); see also Grow, supra note 8, at 609 (“[C]ontrol over franchise loca- R
tion locations decisions not only allows leagues to ensure that franchises are lo-
cated only in cities large enough to support a team financially, but also that those
cities are not overpopulated with too many teams.”).  For a more detailed discus-
sion of interpretations of business of baseball and decisions regarding league struc-
ture, see supra notes 84-100 and accompanying text. R
103. See Gordon, supra note 28, at 1214 (discussing MLB franchise relocation R
procedures).
104. Id. at 1215 (noting each major league club is granted territorial rights to
geographic region).
105. See id. (“Each home territory is ‘defined by the boundary lines of an en-
tire country or counties (or parish or Canadian division or district).’”); see also
Major League Rule 52(a)(1), (a)(4), (d)(1) (setting forth boundary rules).
106. See Major League Rule 52(a)(4) and (d)(1) (discussing boundary rules).
107. See Lester Munson, San Jose Suit Appears to Be Strong: Major League Baseball
Should Be Taking the City’s Antitrust Lawsuit Very Seriously, ESPN.COM (June 19, 2013),
http://espn.go.com/mlb/story/_/id/9403225/the-san-jose-legal-case-oakland-
strong (noting antitrust exemption, which protects territorial rights, is “slowly
diminishing”).
15
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tual and potential relocations of franchises are not uncommon.108
However, there is a split in the lower courts as to whether franchise
relocation efforts, which violate antitrust laws, are protected by
baseball’s exemption.109  While some courts have expanded the
scope of baseball’s exemption to include franchise relocation, the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania has held that baseball’s exemption
is restricted to the reserve clause.110  Thus, if a jurisdiction were to
follow the rationale in Piazza, then preventing the purchase and
relocation of a baseball club could be found to impermissibly vio-
late antitrust laws.111
IV. SWINGING FOR THE FENCES: SAN JOSE’S SUIT AGAINST
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
“I don’t think anybody ought to have a right to put a big red X on
my city and say, ‘Don’t go there,’. . . Whether they’re selling ham-
burgers or baseball, that’s not right.”
–Chuck Reed, Mayor of San Jose112
A. MLB in San Jose: How the Giants Refuse
to Return the Gesture
In 2009, MLB began seriously considering the relocation of the
A’s from Oakland to San Jose.113  However, over the past four years,
the A’s have seen little progress regarding their request to move the
team to San Jose.114  The primary reason for this inaction is that
“only one baseball team is freely allowed to move to the south end
108. See Gordon, supra note 28, at 1215-16 (discussing cases that addressed R
antitrust allegations associated with relocation of baseball franchises).
109. See id. at 1216 (noting decisions hinge on interpretation of antitrust ex-
emption’s scope).  For a more detailed discussion of lower courts’ interpretations
of scope of baseball’s antitrust exemption, see supra notes 84-100 and accompany- R
ing text.
110. See generally State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 31 Wis.2d 699, cert. denied,
385 U.S. 900 (1966) (interpreting baseball’s exemption to protect all decisions
regarding league structure and organization). But see supra notes 92-97 and accom- R
panying text (discussing narrow interpretation of antitrust exemption in Piazza).
111. For a more detailed discussion of the Piazza decision, see supra notes 92- R
97 and accompanying text. R
112. Costa, supra note 1 (discussing San Jose’s frustration with MLB’s R
franchise relocation policies).
113. See id. (“More than four years have passed since baseball commissioner
Bud Selig appointed a committee to study the Athletics’ proposed move from Oak-
land to San Jose.”).
114. See Munson, supra note 107 (noting A’s are “[f]rustrated and angry after R
four years of inaction”).
16
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of the bay, and it’s the Giants.”115  The San Francisco Giants cur-
rently have the exclusive territorial rights to Santa Clara County,
which contains the city of San Jose.116
It may seem odd that the Giants control the rights to this area,
considering that San Francisco is further from San Jose than Oak-
land.117  However, the Giants acquired the rights to Santa Clara
County in a 1990 agreement between former owners of the Giants
and A’s.118  At that time, Giants owner Bob Lurie coveted a new
ballpark for the team and sought to relocate the Giants to San
Jose.119  On the other side of the San Francisco Bay, the A’s were
experiencing a period of great success.120  Therefore, Lurie asked
Walter Haas, the owner of the A’s at the time, to consent to the
Giants’ relocation to San Jose.121  Described as a “civic-minded phi-
lanthropist who wanted to help the Giants stay in the region,” Haas
not only approved the move, but also asked for nothing in
return.122
At the time of the agreement, Commissioner Bud Selig com-
mended Haas for making a decision “in the best interests of base-
ball.”123  Aside from his philanthropic motivations, Haas and other
A’s officials felt confident about the direction of the franchise.124
Thus, “dividing their territories and handing Silicon Valley to the
115. Grabar, supra note 3 (discussing territorial rights of San Francisco
Giants).
116. See Munson, supra note 107 (acknowledging Giants’ right to Santa Clara R
County market is “primary obstacle” in A’s move to San Jose).
117. See Grabar, supra note 3 (noting irony of Giants’ control of region con-
taining San Jose).
118. See Costa, supra note 1 (suggesting agreement that split Bay Area market R
between Giants and A’s was “seemingly innocuous”); see also Munson, supra note
107 (discussing “Giants’ arguably accidental control of the San Jose market”). R
119. See Costa, supra note 1 (noting desire to move Giants to San Jose spurred
by failure of Lurie to obtain public financing to build new ballpark in San Fran-
cisco); see also Munson, supra note 107 (noting Giants’ desire to “escape Candle- R
stick Park”).
120. See Costa, supra note 1 (noting A’s won 1990 American League pennant R
and ranked third among all baseball clubs in fan attendance).
121. See id. (reporting Lurie asked for Haas’s consent to relocate in order to
avoid challenge by A’s); see also Munson, supra note 107 (acknowledging Haas’s R
right to veto proposed move of Giants to San Jose had he not consented).
122. Costa, supra note 1 (discussing reasons for Haas’s consent); see also Mun- R
son, supra note 107 (noting lack of compensation for approval of Giants’ potential R
relocation).
123. Munson, supra note 107 (“[A]ccording to the lawsuit, Selig said, ‘Walter R
Haas, the wonderful owner of the Oakland club who did things in the best inter-
ests of baseball, granted permission. . . .  What got lost there is they [the A’s] didn’t
feel it was permission in perpetuity.’”).
124. See Costa, supra note 1 (citing former A’s executive’s statement that R
“[A’s] didn’t feel at the time that there was any significant downside to [their]
17
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Giants hardly seemed like a major concession.”125  Ultimately, the
Giants’ attempt to secure public financing for a ballpark in San Jose
failed and the team remained in San Francisco.126  Despite never
moving, the Giants retained the territorial rights to Santa Clara
County.127
Today, the territorial divide remains, but the rights to Santa
Clara County have become incredibly valuable.128  The A’s have al-
ready found a major sponsor and funding for a new stadium if a
move to San Jose should occur.129  Furthermore, A’s owner Lew
Wolff believes that relocating to San Jose is the only way the team
can remain in northern California long-term, as the club has been
unable to reach the necessary agreements for a new ballpark to be
built within its current territory.130  Thus, San Jose officials are de-
termined to lure the A’s to their city.131
However, the Giants ownership is unwilling to extend to the
A’s the same gesture of goodwill that Walter Haas extended to the
Giants in 1990.132  The Giants organization is unwilling to surren-
der its exclusive rights to Santa Clara County, because it appreciates
the economic benefits of the San Jose market and currently avails
itself of substantial sponsorships from tech companies in Silicon
Valley.133  Moreover, the owners of the Giants contend that their
business”).  For a more detailed discussion of prior success of A’s franchise, see
supra note 120 and accompanying text. R
125. Costa, supra note 1 (discussing lack of understanding and concern for R
implications of granting Giants territorial rights to Santa Clara County at time of
agreement).
126. See id. (noting Lurie sold Giants to investor group that financed Giants’
new ballpark, AT&T Park).
127. See id. (noting current state of franchise geography in Bay Area); see also
Munson, supra note 107 (discussing plaintiffs’ argument that Giants’ rights to San R
Jose expired because “the grant of San Jose territorial rights to the Giants was
‘subject to their moving to Santa Clara County.’”).
128. For a more detailed discussion of the economic appeal of professional
baseball market in San Jose and Silicon Valley, see supra notes 3-5 and accompany- R
ing text.
129. For a more detailed discussion of potential sponsorship and funding, see
supra note 5 and accompanying text. R
130. See Costa, supra note 1 (noting Wolff’s contention that A’s have “ex- R
hausted all viable options for a new stadium within its territory, including failed
talks in Oakland and nearby Fremont”).
131. See Munson, supra note 107 (suggesting frustration over MLB’s inaction R
regarding A’s relocation request precipitated lawsuit by San Jose officials).
132. See Costa, supra note 1 (stating “Giants refuse to relinquish their exclu- R
sive rights to the area”); see also Bill Shaikin, San Jose, MLB Should Try to Reach Deal
on Criteria to Move A’s, L.A. TIMES (June 29, 2013, 3:58 PM), http://www.latimes
.com/sports/la-sp-0630-down-the-line-20130630,0,2673045.story#axzz2b1QMG9yG
(reporting Giants uninterested in selling rights to San Jose).
133. See Costa, supra note 1 (noting Yahoo and Oracle sponsor Giants). R
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decisions to purchase the club and finance its new ballpark were
“part based on that territorial exclusivity.”134
In order for the A’s to relocate to San Jose, they would need
the approval of three-quarters of MLB franchises.135  However,
MLB has not allowed its owners to vote on the issue and, further-
more, the potential result of such a vote is unclear.136  Commis-
sioner Selig “prefers unanimous votes,” and “generally does not
allow any vote unless he has a pretty good sense of the outcome.”137
Predictably, San Jose officials have grown frustrated with MLB’s ap-
parent unwillingness to address the potential relocation of the
A’s.138
On June 16, 2013, a plumbing issue that caused raw sewage to
flow into the locker rooms of the outdated Oakland Coliseum
reignited frustrations surrounding the unclear future of the A’s.139
Subsequently, the city of San Jose filed a lawsuit against MLB in the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on June
18, 2013.140  San Jose does not want to wait any longer for the MLB
or the franchise owners to make up their minds.141  The city of San
Jose is “pushing the go button,” forcing MLB to either reach a set-
134. Id. (discussing Giants’ interest in rights to Santa Clara County); see also
supra notes 126-128 (discussing Giants’ current territorial rights and financing of R
AT&T Park).
135. See Grabar, supra note 3 (describing MLB voting criteria for franchise R
relocation).
136. See Shaikin, supra note 132 (contending vote “would be divided and un- R
predictable, with the likelihood of intense lobbying”).
137. Id. (noting MLB’s concerns over certainty of ballpark construction and
revenue projections).
138. See id. (noting Mayor Reed’s contention vote could have been held years
ago, and proposing “MLB gives San Jose criteria to meet, and the two sides agree
on a deadline.  If San Jose meets the criteria and the deadline, and if the A’s fulfill
their guidelines, then MLB lets the owners vote – with no guarantee of approval.”).
139. See Costa, supra note 1 (noting incident “prompted renewed outcry for R
the [A’s] . . . to get a new stadium”).
140. See generally Complaint, City of San Jose v. Office of Comm’r of Baseball,
No. 5:13CV02787, 2013 WL 2996788 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2013) (noting plaintiffs
composed of San Jose officials and organizations).  For a more detailed discussion
of the lawsuit, see supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text. R
141. See Dennis O’Donnell, Gameday: Who Has the Edge in the MLB. Vs. SJ Court
Battle?, CBS S.F. (June 19, 2013, 10:29 AM), http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/
2013/06/19/gameday-who-has-the-edge-in-the-mlb-vs-sj-court-battle/ (reporting,
per Giants executive, Blue Ribbon Committee’s “silence was a finding in itself”
regarding relocation of A’s); see also Costa, supra note 1 (noting MLB had no inten- R
tion of MLB holding vote on relocation of A’s at August owners meeting after San
Jose filed suit).
19
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tlement and address the potential relocation of the A’s, or defend
baseball’s antitrust exemption in court.142
B. Assessing Potential Outcomes of Litigation
San Jose’s suit against MLB joins a long line of challenges to
baseball’s league structure and overall antitrust exemption.143
Some experts contend that San Jose has a strong case, arguing that
current trends in American antitrust jurisprudence portend the
end of baseball’s exemption.144  On the other hand, given the Su-
preme Court’s repeated affirmation of the exemption, this lawsuit
is perceived by others as a futile effort to attack baseball’s antitrust
status.145  Others still believe that a settlement is the most likely out-
come and that San Jose is simply attempting to force MLB to facili-
tate the relocation of the A’s to San Jose.146  This section will discuss
the likelihood and impact of these various outcomes.147
1. First Scenario: San Jose Wins on Appeal
“San Jose’s lawsuit against Major League Baseball could easily
become [C]ommissioner Bud Selig’s worst nightmare.”
–Lester Munson148
The plaintiffs in this case contend that professional baseball is
founded on competition between clubs, and therefore MLB’s re-
strictions on relocation amount to “unreasonable, unlawful, and an-
ticompetitive restraints under Section [One] of the Sherman
142. See O’Donnell, supra note 141 (arguing “San Jose doesn’t want to litigate R
this thing.  Baseball surely doesn’t want to go to court on the remote possibility
that Justice Scalia turns out to be an A’s fan. . . .  After four years of silence, base-
ball will have to finally be forced to act, or else.”).
143. See Grow, supra note 8, at 606-07 (“Disputes regarding the league struc- R
ture have been the single most common source of antitrust litigation involving
professional baseball.”).
144. See Munson, supra note 107 (stating baseball’s antitrust “exemption is R
unlikely to survive the San Jose attack if the lawsuit is not settled and proceeds to
trial. . . .  The higher courts of the U.S. have been demonstrated an increasing
unwillingness to grant MLB or any other sports league further exemptions from
the antitrust laws.”).
145. See Grabar, supra note 3 (noting Supreme Court has previously “punted R
on the issue, leaving it to Congress to change the law.  For this reason, it’s unlikely
that they’ll revise the 1922 decision this time around or ever.”).
146. See Feldman, supra note 26 (discussing implications of potential settle- R
ment); see also Munson, supra note 107 (noting pressure on MLB resulting from R
suit).
147. For a discussion of why a settlement would be advisable for both parties,
see infra notes 197-208 and accompanying text. R
148. Munson, supra note 107 (discussing San Jose’s lawsuit against MLB and R
potential impact to MLB’s structure should it lose).
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Act.”149  In response, MLB contends that this “lawsuit is an un-
founded attack on the fundamental structures of a professional
sports league.”150  MLB’s contention is partially accurate, insofar as
San Jose has directed its attack on MLB’s ability to regulate the
“business of baseball” and, in particular, its system of territorial
rights – a cornerstone in the league’s ability to control franchise
location and maintain local monopolies free from the purview of
federal antitrust laws.151  At the same time, the lawsuit can hardly be
considered “unfounded.”152  Preventing the relocation of MLB
clubs is a clear violation of antitrust laws, albeit the type of violation
that has been historically protected by baseball’s exemption.153  Op-
ponents of the exemption argue that its breadth, force, and rele-
vance have been fading since its creation in 1922, and therefore
suggest that the courts should no longer recognize it.154
A central theme of San Jose’s argument is that baseball’s ex-
emption is outdated.155  This attack is directed at Justice Holmes’s
opinion in Federal Baseball, which created an antitrust exemption for
professional baseball on the premise that baseball, in 1922, did not
constitute interstate commerce.156  As an indication of the weaken-
ing relevance of baseball’s exemption, fifty years later Justice Black-
mun explicitly stated in his opinion in Flood that baseball is, in fact,
149. Complaint at 7, City of San Jose v. Office of Comm’r of Baseball, No.
5:13CV02787, 2013 WL 2996788 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2013) (noting provisions of
MLB’s constitution explicitly restrict competition in league composed of teams in
competition with one another).
150. Munson, supra note 107 (quoting statement by executive president of R
MLB, Rob Manfred).
151. See id. (describing territorial rights of professional baseball franchises as
“most vulnerable corner of baseball’s foundation”).  For a more detailed discus-
sion of the effect of MLB’s system of territorial rights, see supra notes 6-9 and R
accompanying text.
152. Munson, supra note 107 (contending baseball’s antitrust exemption “un- R
likely to survive” if lawsuit proceeds to trial).
153. For a more detailed discussion of the issues and decisions regarding
baseball’s antitrust exemption and franchise relocation, see supra notes 107-111 R
and accompanying text.
154. See Munson, supra note 107 (arguing trends in law suggest San Jose has R
viable argument to defeat exemption).
155. See Complaint at 3, City of San Jose v. Office of Comm’r of Baseball, No.
5:13CV02787, 2013 WL 2996788 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2013) (stating “[w]hereas
baseball may have started as a local affair, modern baseball is squarely within the
realm of interstate commerce.  MLB Club ply their wares nationwide; games are
broadcast throughout the country on satellite TV and radio, as well as cable chan-
nels; and MLB Clubs have fan bases that span from coast to coast.”).
156. For a more detailed discussion of the holding in Federal Baseball, see supra
notes 49-52 and accompanying text. R
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interstate commerce.157  Nevertheless, the Flood court upheld the
exemption, justifying its holding by falling back on the unique sta-
tus and development of baseball, and thus abandoned the Court’s
original rationale set forth in Federal Baseball for creating the
exemption.158
In addition to the depleted relevance of the Supreme Court’s
reason for granting baseball’s antitrust exemption, courts are mov-
ing away from granting similar exemptions to other professional
sports leagues.159  In American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League,
the Supreme Court found that sports leagues fall under the purview
of antitrust laws.160  The Court noted that each NFL team is “a sub-
stantial, independently owned, independently managed busi-
ness . . . .  They compete with one another, not only on the playing
field, but to attract fans, for gate receipts, and for contracts with
managerial and playing personnel.”161  The Court’s unanimous de-
cision in American Needle points to its growing aversion to protecting
sports leagues from antitrust laws.162
Courts considering San Jose’s claims against MLB will look to
previous interpretations of the scope of baseball’s antitrust exemp-
tion.163  While most courts have adopted a broad interpretation as
to the scope of the exemption, some courts have held that the Su-
preme Court’s decisions in Federal Baseball, Toolson and Flood pertain
only to the reserve clause.164  For San Jose to prevail on its antitrust
claims, it will have to convince the appellate court that these minor-
157. For a more detailed discussion of Justice Blackmun’s findings in Flood,
see supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text. R
158. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (ruling exemption is “fully R
entitled to the benefit of stare decisis,” despite finding baseball qualified as inter-
state commerce).
159. See Munson, supra note 107 (“[H]igher courts of the U.S. have been R
demonstrating an increasing unwillingness to grant MLB or any other sports
league further exemptions from the antitrust laws.”).
160. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S.Ct. 2201, 2206 (2010)
(declaring decisions made by NFL teams are covered by Section One of Sherman
Act).
161. Am. Needle, 130 S.Ct. at 2205-06 (noting while teams “may be similar in
some sense to a single enterprise, they are not similar in the relevant functional
sense.  While teams have common interests such as promoting the NFL brand,
they are still separate, profit-maximizing entities, and their interests . . . are not
necessarily aligned.”).
162. See Munson, supra note 107 (stating American Needle opinion “offers MLB R
little hope of preserving its exemption on market territories”).
163. For a more detailed discussion of the scope of baseball’s antitrust exemp-
tion, see supra notes 84-100 and accompanying text. R
164. For a more detailed discussion of how the narrow interpretation of base-
ball’s antitrust exemption limits it to reserve clause, see supra notes 84-100 and R
accompanying text.
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ity cases, such as Piazza, were correctly decided.165  If San Jose can
accomplish that goal, then the Ninth Circuit could potentially strike
down the exemption.166
Of the three possible outcomes for this litigation, a victory for
San Jose would have the greatest and most widespread impact.167  A
loss for MLB would pave the way for “MLB’s most radical restructur-
ing since the late Marvin Miller destroyed the owners’ revered re-
serve clause. . . .”168  Overruling baseball’s exemption would
“eliminate territorial rights across all baseball markets.”169  Conse-
quently, any professional baseball team would be free to relocate to
any city of its choosing.170
Ultimately, it is unlikely that this lawsuit will result in a victory
for San Jose—at least not in the courtroom.171  As previously noted,
the district court recently dismissed San Jose’s antitrust claims.172
In its holding, the district court rejected San Jose’s argument that
baseball’s exemption is limited to the reserve clause.173  Addition-
ally, the district court warned that the Ninth Circuit has previously
165. For a more detailed discussion of court decisions limiting applicability of
exemption to reserve clause, see supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text. R
166. See Ira Boudway, San Jose Sues Over Baseball’s Weird Business Geography,
BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (June 19, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/
2013-06-19/san-jose-sues-over-baseballs-weird-business-geography (discussing Curt
Flood Act and acknowledging “‘narrow strand of case law holding that now that
player restraints are no longer exempt, [and] that the exemption is essentially
gone’”).
167. For a more detailed discussion of potential outcomes of San Jose v. MLB,
see supra notes 133-135 and accompanying text. R
168. See Munson, supra note 107 (likening impact of elimination of reserve R
clause and potential loss of antitrust exemption, noting if MLB loses exemption it
“will find itself facing a new form of free agency”).
169. See Feldman, supra note 26 (“MLB would lose its ability to dictate R
franchise locations, so any team could move anywhere with little or no oversight.”).
170. See id. (proclaiming A’s would even be able to move next to Giants’
ballpark); see also Munson, supra note 107 (noting victory for San Jose could free R
financially weaker clubs to move if “they can produce greater profits as a third
team in New York or a first team in Las Vegas”).
171. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283 (1972)) (noting Supreme Court’s
strong reluctance to overturn Federal Baseball and Toolson, and that Flood court pre-
ferred that Congress remedy issues with baseball’s antitrust exemption); see also
Grabar, supra note 3 (indicating victory for San Jose unlikely because exemption R
has previously been upheld, and Supreme Court “punted on the issue, leaving it to
Congress to change the law.”); see also O’Donnell, supra note 141 (considering like- R
lihood of elimination of baseball’s exemption to be five percent). But see Munson,
supra note 107 (“The exemption is unlikely to survive the San Jose attack if the R
lawsuit is not settled and proceeds to a trial.”).
172. See generally City of San Jose v. Office of Comm’r of Baseball, No. C-13-
02787 RMW, 2013 WL 5609346 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2013) (noting San Jose’s state
law tort claims were sufficiently pled to survive MLB’s motion to dismiss).
173. See City of San Jose, 2013 WL 5609346 at *2 (“All federal circuit courts that
have considered the issue . . . have not limited the antitrust exemption to the re-
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adopted a broad view of the exemption’s scope.174  However, the
district court also conceded that the Ninth Circuit adopted this
broad interpretation of the exemption’s scope “without substantial
analysis” of the Supreme Court’s controlling precedent in Federal
Baseball, Toolson and Flood.175  Nevertheless, if San Jose appeals the
district court’s decision, it is more likely that either MLB will prevail
or the parties will settle.176
2. Second Scenario: MLB Prevails in Court
MLB is arguing that the antitrust exemption covers franchise
location issues.177  This argument is supported by the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Federal Baseball, Toolson and Flood.178  The plain-
tiffs contend that the reasoning for the exemption is outdated, evi-
denced by the growing unwillingness of the Supreme Court to
grant antitrust exemptions to professional sports leagues.179  Never-
theless, although the Supreme Court has acknowledged each of the
criticisms raised by the plaintiffs, the Court has continued to recog-
nize the exemption as it applies to professional baseball.180  In City
of San Jose v. Office of the Commissioner of Baseball, the district court
serve clause, but have adopted the view that the exemption broadly covers the
‘business of baseball.’”).
174. See id. at *2 (noting Ninth Circuit has not limited antitrust exemption to
reserve clause); see also Portland Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 491 F.2d 1101, 1102-
03 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (dismissing antitrust claims); see also Portland
Baseball Club, Inc. v. Baltimore Baseball Club, Inc., 282 F.2d 680, 680 (9th Cir.
1960) (holding “that if professional baseball is to be brought within the pale of
federal antitrust laws, the Congress must do it.”).
175. See City of San Jose, 2013 WL 5609346 at *7 (discussing district court’s
interpretation of Ninth Circuit precedent).
176. See S. Jose’s Claims Against MLB Denied, supra note 22 (noting San Jose’s R
intention to appeal). For a discussion of the implications and likelihood of either
a victory for MLB or a settlement, see infra notes 177-208 and accompanying text. R
177. See Costa, supra note 1 (quoting former MLB commissioner Fay Vincent, R
stating, “ ‘If there’s any value in the antitrust exemption at all, that’s the value, that
these guys can get together and prohibit people from coming into their mar-
kets’”); see also Grow, supra note 8, at 607 (noting baseball’s antitrust exemption R
originated from Federal Baseball decision involving league structure issues).
178. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972) (noting Flood Court’s recog-
nition of complex and incongruous development of judicially created antitrust ex-
emption, nevertheless deciding to afford benefit of stare decisis).
179. For a more detailed discussion of the plaintiffs’ arguments regarding the
relevance of the Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Baseball and current trends in
Supreme Court jurisprudence, see supra notes 155-162 and accompanying text. R
180. See Boudway, supra note 166 (“San Jose is not the first to note the evolu- R
tion of baseball into big business.  ‘People believed in the 1940s, ‘50s, and ‘60s that
the exemption was outdated and anomalous . . . .  The Supreme Court has recog-
nized that the antitrust exemption is, in fact, anomalous and yet they have reaf-
firmed it.’”).  For a more detailed discussion of Justice Blackmun’s observations
regarding baseball’s status under antitrust laws as “an exception and an anomaly,”
24
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recognized that baseball’s antitrust exemption is “unrealistic, incon-
sistent, or illogical,” yet the court still dismissed San Jose’s antitrust
claims in accordance with baseball’s longstanding exemption from
antitrust laws.181
Moreover, the Court has repeatedly expressed its contention
that the task of determining the status of professional baseball
under antitrust laws lies with the legislature.182  In City of San Jose,
Judge Whyte reiterated the Supreme Court’s explicit ruling that any
change to baseball’s exemption for “the business of baseball” must
be made by Congress.183  Considering the weight of Supreme Court
precedent on this issue, it appears there is a slim chance that plain-
tiffs will prevail in challenging the validity of baseball’s antitrust
exemption.184
As for any arguments regarding the scope of baseball’s anti-
trust exemption, it appears that MLB, once again, has the upper
hand.185  Not only have the majority of courts adopted a broad in-
terpretation of the exemption’s scope, but the few decisions that
have limited the exemption are suspect.186  The Eastern District of
Pennsylvania’s decision in Piazza resulted from a seemingly flawed
analysis of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Federal Baseball, Toolson
and Flood.187  First, the Piazza court incorrectly determined that the
and noting that Federal Baseball and Toolson decisions are “an aberration confined
to baseball”, see supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text. R
181. City of San Jose v. Office of Comm’r of Baseball, No. C-13-02787 RMW,
2013 WL 5609346, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2013) (quoting Radovich v. Nat’l Foot-
ball League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957)).
182. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 285 (“[W]hat the Court said in Federal Baseball in
1922 and what it said in Toolson in 1953, we say again here in 1972: the remedy, if
any is indicated, is for congressional, and not judicial, action.”).  For a more de-
tailed discussion of the Toolson court’s conclusions and suggestions that issues with
baseball’s antitrust exemptions should be fixed by Congress, see supra note 66 and R
accompanying text.
183. City of San Jose, 2013 WL 5609346 at *10 (ruling Supreme Court’s obser-
vation in Flood “that the business of baseball is now interstate commerce cannot
override the Court’s ultimate holding that Congressional inaction . . . shows Con-
gress’s intent that the judicial exception for ‘the business of baseball’ remain
unchanged”).
184. See Grabar, supra note 3 (acknowledging Supreme Court has “punted” R
on issue of baseball’s antitrust exemption, opting instead to defer to Congress,
thus making it unlikely Court will overturn Federal Baseball).
185. For a more detailed discussion of how the narrow interpretation of base-
ball’s antitrust exemption limits it to reserve clause and an explanation for why the
majority of courts do not limit the scope of the antitrust exemption to the reserve
clause, see supra notes 84-100 and 164 and accompanying text. R
186. See Grow, supra note 8, at 591-92 (arguing Piazza, Butterworth, and Morsani R
cases were wrongly decided).
187. See id. at 592 (arguing flaws in Piazza court’s analysis “appl[y] with equal
force” to Butterworth and Morsani cases); see also Gordon, supra note 28, at 1228-29 R
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Federal Baseball and Toolson decisions only concerned the reserve
clause.188  Second, the Piazza court erred in concluding that the
Flood decision “vitiated the precedential effect of Toolson.”189  Fi-
nally, commentators criticize the Piazza court for incorrectly con-
cluding that the Supreme Court’s decision in Flood limited the
scope of baseball’s antitrust exemption to the reserve clause.190  In
City of San Jose, Judge Whyte concluded that “the federal antitrust
exemption for the ‘business of baseball’ remains unchanged, and
[it] is not limited to the reserve clause.”191  In arriving at its deci-
sion, the court noted its disagreement with the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania’s opinion in Piazza, stating Federal Baseball, Toolson and
Flood cannot “be limited to the reserve clause because the reserve
clause is never referenced in any of those cases as part of the
Court’s holdings.”192
If the Ninth Circuit adopts a broad interpretation of baseball’s
antitrust exemption, then MLB will prevail in defending the exemp-
(stating flaws in Piazza court’s analysis “consequently led the courts in both Piazza
and Butterworth to conclude that baseball’s exemption does not extend to
franchise relocation.”).  For a more detailed discussion of the Piazza court’s ratio-
nale, see supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text. R
188. See Gordon, supra note 28, at 1228 (noting Federal Baseball opinion did R
not discuss reserve clause); see also Grow, supra note 8, at 600 (“[E]ven if the Piazza R
court correctly held that Flood had limited both Federal Baseball and Toolson to
their facts, it nevertheless erred when concluding that those cases dealt simply with
the reserve clause.  In actuality, both cases involved more extensive allegations of
anticompetitive conduct, meaning that neither case can properly be limited to
cover only the reserve clause.”).
189. Grow, supra note 8, at 596-97 (arguing Piazza court misinterpreted Tool- R
son decision by making proposition in Flood “that Toolson was simply ‘a narrow
application of the doctrine of stare decisis,’” rather than recognizing Flood “explic-
itly affirmed Toolson’s reinterpretation and expansion of Federal Baseball.”); see
also Gordon, supra note 28, at 1228-29 (stating Piazza court “wrongly interpreted R
Toolson as holding that baseball is not interstate commerce.  In actuality, the Tool-
son court only reaffirmed baseball’s exemption because Congress had not yet sub-
jected baseball to federal antitrust laws.”).
190. See Grow, supra note 8, at 592 (“[N]owhere in Flood did the Court specif- R
ically express its intent to limit the baseball exemption to the reserve clause”).
Grow further argues the Flood Court’s discussion of cases relating to umpire rela-
tions and franchise locations “without criticism thus illustrates that the Court un-
derstood that the baseball exemption applied to a variety of aspects of the baseball
business . . . .” Id. at 592-95.
191. City of San Jose v. Office of Comm’r of Baseball, No. C-13-02787 RMW,
2013 WL 5609346, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2013) (discussing reasoning for dis-
missal of antitrust claims).
192. Id. at *10 (noting Supreme Court’s holding in Flood addressed baseball’s
reserve system as “the only alleged anticompetitive restraint on trade in that case,”
and thus “naturally held that under Federal Baseball and Toolson, the reserve system,
a part of the ‘broader business of baseball,’ continued to enjoy exemption from
the antitrust laws”).
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tion.193  After all, “decisions relating to the league structure were
the primary impetus leading to Federal Baseball.”194  Therefore,
under a broad interpretation of the exemption’s scope, restricting
franchise relocation, which violates antitrust laws, would be pro-
tected by baseball’s exemption because franchise location decisions
affect league structure and directly impact the “business of base-
ball.”195  Ultimately, a victory for MLB would be unsurprising and
would simply maintain the league’s current status quo.196
3. Third Scenario: Settlement – Introducing the San Jose A’s
Initially, the plaintiffs optimistically viewed the district court’s
dismissal of their antitrust claims as a partial victory because it al-
lowed San Jose to pursue allegations of contract interference relat-
ing to an agreement between the city and the A’s to purchase land
for a new ballpark in San Jose.197  On the other hand, MLB was
encouraged by the district court’s dismissal because it eliminated
the claims that posed the greatest risk to the league.198  San Jose
was dealt a further blow on December 27, 2013, when Judge Whyte
dismissed the remaining claims against MLB.199  Nevertheless, pre-
vailing on the contract interference claim would not have automati-
cally brought the A’s to San Jose.200
193. See Grow, supra note 8, at 607 (noting majority of courts consider anti- R
trust exemption to cover decisions regarding league structure because such deci-
sions are “integral to the business of baseball”).
194. Id. at 611 (arguing standard for determining activities protected by ex-
emption should be whether activity “directly affect[s] the business of providing
baseball exhibitions” to public).
195. Id. at 609 (noting franchise location decisions prevent flooded markets,
affect competitive balance, and ensure balanced allocation of teams nationwide);
see also id. at 585-86 (discussing business of baseball and justifications for exempt-
ing restriction of franchise relocation).
196. See Feldman, supra note 26 (acknowledging greatest impact of MLB vic- R
tory would be on San Jose’s quest to acquire professional baseball club).
197. See John Woolfolk, San Jose vs. MLB: Judge Splits Decision on Claims over A’s
South Bay Plans, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Oct. 11, 2013, 11:40 AM), http://www
.mercurynews.com/politics-government/ci_24290747/judge-dismisses-san-jose-
antitrust-claims-against-mlb (noting plaintiffs encouraged by opportunity to con-
tinue litigating issue arising from MLB’s delay in voting to approve relocation of
A’s).
198. See id. (noting district court’s dismissal of antitrust claims represents le-
gal win for MLB because it eliminated “‘the heart’” of San Jose’s case).
199. See Judge Dismisses San Jose’s Remaining Claims vs. MLB, CSNBAYAREA.COM
(Jan. 3, 2014, 8:45 PM), http://www.csnbayarea.com/athletics/judge-dismisses-
san-joses-remaining-claims-vs-mlb (noting two remaining state law claims were dis-
missed without prejudice).
200. See id. (discussing insignificance of state law claims compared to illegal
monopoly claims); see also Woolfolk, supra note 197 (reporting remaining claim R
“‘isn’t of itself going to get San Jose a baseball team,’”).
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Going forward, if the plaintiffs’ ultimate goal is to secure the
relocation of the A’s to San Jose then their best course of action is
to reach a settlement with MLB, rather than rely on an unlikely
legal victory on appeal.201  The potential terms of a settlement are
uncertain, but it is likely that any agreement would include signifi-
cant concessions to the San Francisco Giants.202  In order to help
predict the terms of a potential settlement agreement, it is worth
considering the recent agreement between Baltimore Orioles
owner Peter Angelos and MLB, which allowed the Montreal Expos
to relocate to Washington D.C. and become the Washington Na-
tionals.203  As compensation for the Nationals entering that re-
gion’s professional baseball market, Angelos received an incredibly
lucrative television deal.204  Similar remuneration may be offered to
the Giants majority owner Charles Johnson, who would be relin-
quishing control over a thriving economic region.205
As for the impact of a settlement on the relative territorial
rights of the two Bay Area clubs, it is possible that the A’s and Gi-
ants could share the entire Bay Area market, similar to the way the
Yankees and Mets share the New York baseball market.206  In the
end, such an agreement, although costly, would accomplish San
Jose’s goal of acquiring a professional baseball team.207  As for
201. For a more detailed discussion of the likelihood that San Jose would lose
at trial, see supra notes 171-195 and accompanying text. R
202. See O’Donnell, supra note 141 (stating Giants would demand “outra- R
geous ransom” from A’s and MLB for forfeiture of exclusive territorial rights to
Santa Clara County); see also Grabar, supra note 3 (predicting any settlement agree- R
ment would involve extremely favorable financial conditions for Giants owner).
203. See Grabar, supra note 3 (noting owner of Baltimore Orioles, Peter R
Angelos, expressed concern over impact of Expos’ relocation on Orioles’
revenue).
204. See id. (stating Angelos “leveraged his concern into a new television net-
work, MASN, that carries the games of both teams but whose finances are remarka-
bly, controversially favorable to Angelos and his Orioles”); see also Bruce Fein,
Taking the Stand: Baseball’s Privileged Antitrust Exemption, D.C. BAR, http://www.dc
bar.org/bar-resources/publications/washington-lawyer/articles/october-2005-tak
ing-the-stand.cfm (last visited May 5, 2014) (describing deal as “virtual expropria-
tion of the Washington Nationals’ broadcast rights,” whereby Angelos was granted
ninety percent ownership of MASN).
205. See Grabar, supra note 3 (speculating Giants would not settle for terms R
less lucrative than those received by Orioles and Angelos).  For a more detailed
discussion of the economic appeal of San Jose as a professional sports market, see
supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. R
206. See Feldman, supra note 26 (noting decision to become two-team market R
would preclude other baseball clubs from moving to Bay Area pursuant to MLB
restrictions on relocation).
207. See id. (noting San Jose is concerned with Bay Area territorial rights and
acquiring A’s, but “has no issue with the state of baseball outside the Bay Area”).
For a more detailed discussion of San Jose’s reasons for coveting the A’s, see supra
notes 4-8 and accompanying text. R
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MLB, a settlement agreement would ensure that professional base-
ball, for the time being, would not lose its treasured antitrust
exemption.208
V. CONCLUSION
Baseball enjoys a privileged status among professional sports in
the United States, and San Jose must accept this.209  MLB has been
allowed to develop under an antitrust shield for nearly a century.210
This special dispensation has created an environment where viable
markets, such as San Jose, cannot readily acquire a professional
team if they are located in an existing club’s territory.211  Times
have changed since Justice Holmes delivered his opinion in Federal
Baseball.212  Baseball’s exemption has become outdated, supported
by an anomalous progeny of Supreme Court cases.213  Unfortu-
nately for San Jose, while the Supreme Court has acknowledged the
deficiencies in its Federal Baseball and Toolson decisions, it has de-
cided not to redress them.214  Given the Supreme Court’s demon-
strated reluctance to alter the status of professional baseball under
federal antitrust laws, San Jose is unlikely to prevail in this law-
suit.215  Ultimately, San Jose’s officials would be wise to pursue a
208. See Feldman, supra note 26 (indicating settlement would not threaten R
MLB’s control over franchise geography, but rather would simply adjust territorial
rights of Giants and A’s in Bay Area).
209. For a more detailed discussion of the unique status of professional base-
ball and MLB’s ability to maintain monopolies by controlling franchise geography,
see supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. R
210. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283 (1972) (concluding failure to enact
remedial legislation over fifty year period “is an aberration that has been with us
now for half a century, one heretofore deemed fully entitled to the benefit of stare
decisis, and one that has survived the Court’s expanding concept of interstate com-
merce.  It rests on a recognition and an acceptance of baseball’s unique character-
istics and needs” and evinces no intention on the part of Congress to bring reserve
system under antitrust laws).
211. See Munson, supra note 107 (discussing MLB’s system regarding territo- R
rial rights for teams).
212. For a more detailed discussion of the Supreme Court’s evolving justifica-
tions for the antitrust exemption, see supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text. R
213. For a more detailed discussion of baseball’s antitrust exemption as
anomalous and Supreme Court’s precedent upholding exemption as aberrations,
see supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text. R
214. For a more detailed discussion of the weaknesses in San Jose’s argument
arising out of the Supreme Court’s determination that baseball’s status under anti-
trust laws should be determined by Congress, see supra notes 177-184 and accom- R
panying text.
215. For a more detailed discussion of the potential outcomes of the lawsuit,
see supra notes 143-208 and accompanying text. R
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settlement.216  Such an agreement will serve both parties’ interests
by providing for the relocation of the A’s to San Jose and simultane-
ously preserving the MLB’s antitrust exemption.217
John Becker*
216. For a more detailed discussion concluding settlement presents best op-
tion for San Jose to achieve goal of acquiring A’s, see supra notes 143-208 and R
accompanying text.
217. For a more detailed discussion of the favorability of potential settlement,
see supra notes 201-208 and accompanying text. R
* J.D. Candidate, May 2014, Villanova University School of Law; B.A., Wash-
ington University in St. Louis, 2010.
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